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CAN TREA1Y lAW BE SUPREME, DIRECTLY
EFFECTIVE, AND AUTONOMOUS ALL AT THE
SAME TIME?
. GE)
(AN EPISTOlARY EXC
RicHARD STITH*

& J.H.H. WEILER**

INTRooucTION To THE CoRREsPONDENCE
•

The European Court ofjustice has long insisted that the
law emerging from the European Community treaties is supreme over national law, directly effective as to individuals,
and :a utonomous or independent of national constitutions.
One of us asserted in a letter to the other, in early 2000, that
such tripartite unity is impossible, that one of the three elements must be absent as a matter of logic, without regard to
the actual wording of the European treaties. Our ensuing debate by correspondence ended on normative matters concerning the value of national and supranational constitutions.
Having been translated and published in Spain in Dos visiones
norteamericanas de la jurisdicci6n de la Union Europea, we present
it here · for the interest and, we hope, enjoyment of Englishspeaking students of European law.
One prefatory clarification: The first issue discussed below concerns substantive treaty law, not th.e frequently discussed question "Who has the right to interpret treaty law?"
(the question of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz). Treaty law may
come before a national court, before an inter- or supranational court, or simply into a university classroom. Wherever it
appears, we may ask whether it is and/ or can be at once supreme, directly effe.ctive, and autonomous .
•

*

Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; richard.stith@
valpo.edu.
** University Professor and Jean Monnet Chair, New York University.
Director, Global Law School Program, New York University School of Law;
weiler@jeanmonnetprogram.org.
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January 17, 2000
Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler
HaiVard ,Law School
Cambridge, :MA 02138
Dear Professor Weiler:
Your CoNSTITU..fiON OF EuROPE is most enjoyable for me and
the students in my "European Federalism" course. Thank you
for ptitting it all together.
Yet something seems to me missing in your response to Theodor Schilling. You write as though it were possible for a treaty
(or for its authorized interpretator) to be autonomous and directly effective as well as supreme.
•

In a nutshell, my thesis to the contrary is that European Community law (or any analogous body of law springing originally
from the cot1sent of nations) can have any two of the following
three characteristics, but not all three. supremacy, autonomy
(meaning that only the treaty and other international sources
of law are decisive), and direct effect.
Supremacy plus atttonomy go easily together, imposing duties
only on states and leaving direct effect dualistically up to domestic constitutional or statutory rules. (This is the old EC
Article 169 etc. approach). Autonomy plus direct effect also
make sense together, as long as the question of supremacy is
decided domestically. And even supremacy and direct effect
are ut1problematic, as long as autonomy is surrendered in
favor of consideration of international and domestic law as a
single system. · (For example, the European Court of Justice
could have responded to Germany's Solange Las the Advocate
General once proposed, by taking into account national constitution-a l law limits on treaty authority before issuing ECJ
opinions thus surrendering the automony of EC law.) But
there is no logical way that the ECJ can treat EC law as supreme, autonomous, and directly effective.
Let me illustrate with an example I developed last summer
while lecturing on these matters in Spain. Let us suppose that
don Carlos offers to sell the Eitfel Tower to don Jose for a
million pesetas and the latter agrees to the deal. Here we have
a contract (analogy to treaty) involving a surrender by don
Carlos of something which he probably did not own under
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property law (analogy to domestic constitutional law). Assuming that don Carlos does not deliver, how can a court address
the problem?
The court can treat contract law as supreme and autonomotts
(i11dependent of property law). That is, the court can order
don Carlos to pay damages, without even inquiring into questions of property law or related reasons for the non-delivery.
Or the court can treat contract law as atttonomous and directly
effective in property law, by declaring that any interest don
Carlos may have in the Eiffel Tower now belongs to don Jose,
still withottt making any inquiries into actual ownership. The
cottrt can even treat contract law as sttpreme and directly effective, finally settling the whole matter, but only if the court gives
up tl1e autonomy of contract law and takes into account the
original rights (or lack thereof) of don Carlos under property
law.
What the Court cannot do is limit itself to contract law (autonomy), declare that contract law binds regardless of property
law (supremacy), and also insist on having a direct effect on
property law by declaring that don jose is now the legal owner
of the Eiffel Tower! Yet this is exactly what the ECJ does again
and again (e.g., in Costa v. E.N.E.L.), claiming supremacy, autonomy, and direct effect over matters that depend originally
on do1nestic co.nstitutional arguments.
What should a Member State, or a high court of a Member
State, do when faced with such an order by the ECJ? I think it
can do only what don Carlos and don jose would have to do if
faced with a declaration that don Jose had become the owner
of the Eiffel Tower. Since this result is logically impossible, the
court's order can only be interpreted to be the single logically
possible directly effective mandate in disguise (i.e., a declaration that all interests fortnerly held by don Carlos now belong
to don Jose).
In the EC context, domestic constitutional law would trump
the ECJ, but not because of some supposed right of "auto-interpretation" of the treaties. Rather, such a response would
represent the maximum possible compliance with the ECJ
compatible with logic and the rule of law. The national courts
can do more than let the ECJ dispose of the limited powers
given up in the treaties.
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I would be most interested in. any. thoughts or comments you
might have on the above.
Sincerely,

•

Richard Stith
Professor of Law

February 13, 2000
Professor Richard Stith
School of Law
Valparaiso University
Indiana
Dear Colleague,

Thank you very much for your letter ofJanuary 17th. I am on
sabbatical this year away from HaiVard so that mail sometimes
reaches me erratically.
Thank you too for your kind comments. I have thought about
them a lot and inconclusively. ·T he main problem I have is
with the notion of autonomy. What exactly does it mean?
What are its constitutional implications? In all my work, including my reply to Schilling, I try to avoid using and certainly
relying on autonomy as a legal category, though it is used
widely, especially in the German literature, simply because I
am never sure that I grasp what it means.
If you define autonomy as meaning that only treaty and other
international sources are relevant to the resolution of a legal
issue, I still do not see why logically a system deriving from the
consent of States cannot have all three elements. Rather than
explain today why I think your hypo is not conclusive (I would
be happy to do that in the future) I want to set up my own
example for your conside.r ation.
Imagine a Treaty which had the following clauses:

1. The High Contracting Parties. agree that all imports into
any Treaty member will be classified and valued according to
this Treaty and customs duties will be imposed by a schedule
annexed to this Treaty. (substantive. obligation: common external tariff)

2. Reaffirming the general principles of Public International
Law, the High Contracting Parties agree that the provisions of
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this Treaty will take precedence over any conflicting norm of a
High Contracting Party. (supremacy)
-3. So as to ensure the imposition of the same customs in all
High Contracting Parties, the provisions of this Treaty, and
this Treaty alone, will determine all matters concerning the
classification, valuation and imposition of duties of imported
goods to the exclusion of any other source of law unless it is
recognized in this Treaty as a valid source. (autonomy)
4. The High Contracting Parties also agree that the obligation
contained in this Treaty will create rights for individuals which

it is the duty of all national courts to apply in accordance with
this Treaty (direct effect) including the duty of national courts
to abide by the principles of autonomy and supremacy.
5. To remove any doubts the High Contracting Parties declare
that it is their express intention that this Treaty create a system
that is autonomous, supreme, and produces direct effect. The
High Contracting Parties also agree that depositing the act of
ratification of this Treaty will constitute certification by a High
Contracting Party that all internal obstacles, including constitutional limitations, to the operation of this Treaty have been
removed. The Treaty will come into force when all States deposit an act of ratification.
Imagine now that this Treaty has come into force. Why, logically, would such a Treaty, based on the consent of States, not
be o_n e which is autonomous, supreme, and produces direct
effect? Whether the EU treaties are of such a nature is a matter of fact. But you. seem to argue that it is not possible ipso
jure to have such a regime. That I fail to see.
With all good wishes,
Joseph Weiler

p.s. Do you Email?
March 6; 2000
.

.

'

Professor Joesph H.H. Weiler
Harvard Law School
Cambridge MA 02138
Dear Professor Weiler:
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Thank you for your fax of February 13, responding at generous length to my letter of January 17 concerning problems related to don Carlos's transfer of tl1e Eifiel Tower.
I'm afraid I;m not convinced. Let me address seriatim the
points of view of domestic and of international law (viewpoints
that I admittedly mixed together a bit in my earlier letter).
Even a Treaty such as you describe, which is explicitly intended to have supremacy, autonomy, and direct effect, would
not have all three of these effects before a domestic tribunal.
That tribunal would still depend on domestic law which
means that, whatever the substantive outcome domestically, at
least the "autonomy" of the Treaty would drop out in the
course of local application.
For example, as you suggest, let us suppose that the Treaty
binds all parties to a common external tariff and declares that
all internal constitutional obstacles have been overcome. But
declaring do,e s not make it so. Perhaps the domestic constitution g_rants various provinces the right to impose external tariffs. (Perhaps this constitutional provision is even non-amendable.) If so, then no amount of inter11ational declaring wjll
make this limit go away, any more tl1an a hundred contractual
stipulations can make don Carlos able to sell the Eiffel Tower.
Nemo dat quod non habet. One can't lift oneself by one's own
bootstraps nor jump over one's own shadow., etc.
Perhaps, of course, these limits do not exist, or can be overcome, under domestic law. But my point is that domestic law
must at least be consulted. This already makes Treaty law not
autonomous, and the conclusion of the consultation may be
that the Treaty is not supreme or directly effective either.
As for the international or supranational point of view: Your
hypothetical Treaty's certification that "all internal obstacles ... have been removed" can be read two ways. It can be
seen to be an evidentiary declaration concerning domestic law,
in which case the autonomy of Treaty law is at least nominally
wounded. Moreover, since such a declaration (despite its probative value) has an outside referent, the Treaty is in effect
conceding that internal obstacles are possible, which wounds
direct effect. (Domestic courts could thus use this very provision to buttress their resistance to the Treaty.)
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The second way to understand the no-internal-obstacles provision is merely as a contractual stipulation wholly independent
of domestic legal reality, just as don Carlos and don Jose could
stipulate that in all future contractual litigation don Carlos
shottld be irrebuttably presumed to have owned the Eiffel
Tower prior to the contract. Autonomy is thus preserved, but
direct effect is even more deeply wounded in that, in addition
to the Treaty's concession of the possibility of internal obstacles, there is now no evidence at all (not even a certification or
declaration) that such obstacles do not exist. A tribunal operating with such blinders must know that it is adjudicating only
international rights, not domestic 011es,just as a tribunal operating under the above presumption of Eiffel Tower ownership
would know that it was not deciding actual ownership.
Permit me to turn from the trees to the forest for a moment.
What is at stake here for me is an essential foundation for limited government. Lockean:Jeffersonian political theory ends
with limited state sovereignty because it begins with limited individual sovereignty, e.g., the inalienability of right~. (Hobbes
can end with absolutism because he begins with unlimited liberty.) In the same way, as the Maastricht decision makes clear,
any hegemonic pretensions of the EU are undercut by the
constitutional disabilities of the governments that created it.
Of course, International Law has long irrebuttably presumed
sovereignty to be absolute, or at least apparent authority to be
actual authority. I ~ave no objection to this presumption as a
simplifying prerequisite to a uniform order binding among nations, but only among nations. In order to achieve direct domestic effect, the ECJ has treated this possibly counterfactual
presumption of absolute domestic sovereignty as a matter of
political truth. By a bit of juridical hocus-pocus, it has laid the
foundation of a supreme State and jettisoned one of our best
hopes for a truly new sort of legal order in the world (motivated, as far as I can tell, largely by an unexamined desire for
automatic legal uniformity).
In short, I still contend that when non-absolute, limited governments engage in treaty-making, at least one of the following three characteristics cannot be part of the resulting treaty
law: autonomy, supremacy, or direct effect. And it's a good
thing, too!

736

IN11ERNATIONAL LAW AND POLI11CS

[Vol. 34:729

With best regards,
•

Richard Stith
Professor of Law

P.S. Yes, I do e-mail (Richard.Stith@valpo.edu), but I'm
rather slow at typing.
P.P.S. For your convenience, I am also sending you copies of
our prior correspondence.
June 11, 2000
Professor Richard Stith
School of Law
Valparaiso University
Indiana
Dear Professor Stith:
Thank you for responding with such clarity and force to my
challenge. It may be useful if, following your cue, I first respond to some of the technical issues the trees so to speakand then address the forest as a whole.
As regards the technical issues (the fact that they are tech11ical
does not make them unimportant. The technical argument is,
after all, the poetry of our legal discipline), I think I can now
pinpoint where our differences (and perhaps agreements) lie.
It is in the passage where you say:
.
Even a Treaty such as you describe, which is explicitly
intended to have supremacy, autonomy, and direct
effect, would not have all three of these effects before
a domestic tribunal. That tribunal would still depend
on domestic law which means that, whatever the
substantive outcome domestically, at least the "autonomy" of the Treaty would drop out in the course of
local application.
I agree with you, but I think you prove too much! Yes, internal
law would. still be depended upon. And from this fact you
draw the conclusion that this dependence makes the Treaty
law not autonomous. As I indicated in my previous letter,
since I am not sure what "autonomy" means in this context, I
am willing to agree with this conclusion too. But this is the
point where our agreement might end. If the mere fact that
•

'
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internal law's being consulted eliminates the autonomy of the
Treaty, then it would seem to me that no Treaty could ever be
autonomous. Because when the internal effects of any Treaty
come to be assessed and applied by a domestic tribunal, no
matter what the Treaty says (as you cogently argue) a tribunal
will always have to depend on domestic law to give effect, even
direct effect or supremacy, to an international treaty. But this
would be true not only in the case of a Treaty which stipulated,
as did the one in my example, supremacy, direct effect, and
autonomy, but also in a Treaty which stipulated, let us say, only
direct effect and autonomy or only supremacy and autonomy.
Also, when deciding on the direct effect of this more restricted
treaty, the tribunal will have to depend on domestic law and
this, according to your own argument, means that the treaty
would no longer be autonomous. Now I understood your original argument to say that a Treaty may have any two of the
three attributes (direct effect and autonomy, supremacy and
direct effect, supremacy and
autonomy)
but
never
all
three
.
.
But the only reason you offer why;"my" hypothetical treaty cannot have all three characteristics is that " [ t] hat tribunal would
still depend on domestic law which means that, whatever the
substantive outcome domestically, at least the 'autonomy' of
the Treaty would drop out in the course of local application."
If so then it would seem to me that no treaty can ever be autonomous in the internal legal order of a state, since that de·
pendence on domestic law will always be present by any tribunal applying an international treaty within a domestic legal order.
This conclusion, I want to emphasize, does not strike me as
absurd. I can, in fact, see much force in the argument that no
treaty is truly autonomous in the internal legal order of a State
(though there could be other possible meanings to autonomy,
such as when the Treaty exclusively defines the material content of the obligation). What I cannot accept and do not think ·
yotl have answered is why, if autonomy is possible in a treaty
that stipulates only direct effect despite the fact that also in
this type of treaty a domestic tribunal will depend on domestic
law, it is not possible for such a Treaty to be supreme as well.
In the last paragraphs of your letter you express your broader
and normative concerns. I want to address these, too, though
I fear I cannot quite do it with the same economy of text which
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you have achieved. I apologize for the length of this reflection. I want to say at the outset that I do share your normative
concerns. So I am sympathetic to the reasons behind your
technical argument, though I still think the argument itself
does not hold. I think you would be much more persuasive if
you abandoned your current notion which says that any two
attributes are possible but never all three, and simply say that
autonomy is never truly possible so long as law has to be applied by a domestic tribunal which relies for its authority and
hermeneutics on a national constitutional order.
As to the normative argument itself, I do not think there has
been a more severe critic of the Court of justice in, for example, its dismal failure to be an effective federal policeman and
protect what, in the United States, we would call State Rights.
I was not Stlrprised to see Justice Breyer of the US Supreme
Court relying on the ECJ in justifying a far reach of federal law
in the United States. I have gone so far as suggesting the creation of a new Constitutional Tribunal, composed of sitting
judges of the highest C.o urts in each of the Member States (sitting only ad-hoc so they do not become socialized into a Community ethos) which would decide issues of division of competences between the EU and its Member States and to take that
job away from the European Cottrt of Justice!

And yet, I want to explain why, despite our shared concern for
limited government, I favor the very special constitutional construct of direct effect and supremacy and why, for the same
reason of limited government, I am as suspicious of the totalistic claims of some of the national constitutional courts such
as the German Court in its Maastricht decision as I am of the
European Court of Justice.
Modern liberal constitutions are about limitation of power;
they do articulate fundamental human rights in the best neoKantian tradition; they do reflect a notion of collective identity
as a Community of Values which is far less threatening than
more organic definitions of collective identity. But, like the
moon they, too, have a dark sid~. Very few constitutionalists,
and practically no modern constitutional court, will make an
appeal to natural law. Thus their normative authority, from a
legal point of view, is mostly positivist and is as deep or shallow
as the last constitutional amendment, which in many European countries is much easier than in the USA. The ease with
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which we will rally to the defense of the national Constitution
has a dark side too. Think of the near sacred nature we give to
Constitutions adopted by the morally corrupted societies of
the World War II generation. In the new constitutional posture of national courts in which they hold themselves out as
defending the core constitutional values of their polity, indeed
its very identity, there is not only that huge dose of judicial selfempowerment (which has not always been widely noticed,
since the national cot1rts cloak themselves as defending against
the Barbarians at the Gate the ECJ) but also no small measure of arrogance. Human rights is what provokes the most
strident rhetoric. But constitutional texts in our different polities are remarkably similar. Defending the constitutional identity of the State and its core values turns out in most cases to be
defending some hermeneutic foible adopted by five judges
voting against four. The Banana saga is the perfect symbol of
this farce. There is also an exquisite irony in a constitutional
ethos which in part is motivated by a distaste of older notions
of organic identity and yet at the very same time celebrates
what is an amazing empowerment ·of the unique moral idetltity, wisdom, and, yes, superiority, of the authors of the constitution, the people, and the constittltional demos, when it
wears the hat of pouvoir constituent.
What is unique about the European architecture is the fact
that it demands of the Member States a constitutional discipline, in the concepts of supremacy and direct effect, but demands this withottt a truly Ettropean constitutional foundation, i.e., \Vithout a European Constitution to legitimate it, or
to put it differently, it demands it withottt ever having constitutional autonon1y. (If yotl and I can agree on this reformulation ofyottr original point, our differences will have vanished).
Direct Effect and Supremacy without Autonomy create the
conditions to Europe's most original and foundational principle:, the principle of Constitutional Tolerance, since they itlvite constitutional discipline as a matter of a voluntary act of
self-negation by the State. They do not "have" to do it. No
auto11omy. But they should do it!
Let me explain why.
Europe was bttilt on the ashes of World War II, which witnessed the most horrific alienation of those thought of as
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aliens, an alienation which became annihilation. In some respects the European construct was about the prevention of another such carnage: But that's the easy part and it is unlikely
ever to happen again in Western Europe, thottgh events in the
Balkans remind us that those demons are still within the continent.
More difficult is dealing at a deeper level with the source of
these attitudes. In the realm of the social, in the public
square, the relationship to the alien is at the core of decency.
It is difficult to imagine something normatively more important to the httman condition and to our multicultural socie•
ties.
There are, it seems to me, two basic human strategies of dealing with the alien and these two strategies have played a decisive role in Western civilisation. One strategy is to remove the
boundaries. It is the spirit of "come, be one of us." It is noble
since it involves, of course, elimination of prejudice, of the notion that there are boundaries that cannot be eradicated. But
the "be one of us," however well intentioned, is often an invitation to the alien to be one of us, by being us. Vis-a-vis the
alien, it risks robbing him of his identity. Vis-a-vis one's self, it
may be a subtle manifestation of intolerance. If I cannot tolerate the alien, one way of resolving the dilemma is to make him
like me, no longer an alien. This is, of course, infinitely better
than the physical annihilation. But it is still a form of dangerous internal and external intolerance.
The alternative strategy is to acknowledge the validity of certain forms of bounded identity but simultaneously to reach
across boundaries. We acknowledge and respect difference
(and what is special and unique about ourselves as individuals
and groups) and yet we reach across differences in recognition
of our essential humanity. I never tire of referring to Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), the great neo-Kantian philosopher
of religion, in an exquisite modern interpretation of the Mosaic law on this subject \vhich captures its deep meaning in a
way which retains its vitality even in today's Ever Closer Union.
It can be summarised as follows: The law of shielding the alien
from all wrong is ofvital significance. The alien was to be protected, not because he was a memb.e r of one's family, clan,
religious community, or people; but because he was a human
being. In the alien, therefore, man discovered the idea of "hu•
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manity." What is significant in this are the two elements I have
mentioned: on the one hand, the identity of the alien, as
such, is maintained. One is not invited to go out and, for example, "save him" by inviting him to be one of you. One is not
invited to recast the boundary. On the other hand, despite the
boundaries which are maintained, and constitute the I and the
Alien, one is commanded to reach over the boundary and love
him, in his alienship, as oneself. The alien is accorded human
dignity. The soul of the I is tended to not by eliminating the
temptation to oppress but by maintaining it and overcoming
it.
Europe represents this alternative, civilising strategy of dealing
with the "other." This is, more than peace and prosperity, Europe's true soul. The constitutional expression of this strategy
is the principle of Constitutional Tolerance and it is encapsulated in that most basic articulation of its meta-political objective in the Preamble to the EC Treaty:
Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer
union among the peoples .of Europe.
No matter how close the ·Union, it·is to remain among distinct
peoples. An ever closer union could be achieved by an amalgam of distinct peoples into one nation which is both the
ideal and/ or the de facto experience of most federal and nonfederal states. The rejection by Europe of that One Nation
ideal or destiny is usually understood as intended to preserve
the rich diversity cultural and other of the distinct European peoples as well as to respect their political self-determination. But the European choice has an even deeper spiritual
•
meaning.

An ever closer union is altogether more easy if differences
among the components are eliminated, if they come to resemble each other, if they aspire to become one. The more identical the "other'"s identity is to my own, the easier it is for me to
identify with him and accept him. It demands less of me to
accept another if he is very much like me. It is altogether
more difficult to attain an Ever Closer Union if the components of that Union preserve their distinct identities, if they
retain their "otherness" vis-a-vis each other, if they do not become One Flesh, politically speaking.
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Herein resides the principle of Constitutional Tolerance. Inevitably I define my distinct identity by a boundary which differentiates me from those who are unlike me. My continued
existence as a distinct identity depends, ontologically, on that
boundary and, psychologically and sociologically, on preserving that sentiment of otherness. The call to bond with those
very others in an ever closer union demands an internalisation
(individual and societal) of a very high degree of toleration.
The Leviticus imperative to love thy neighbour as oneself is so
difficult and hence civilising because that neighbour is not like
myself. Living Leviticus 23, or Jesus, or, for the secular, the
Kantian Categorical Imperative is most meaningful when it is
extended to those who are unlike me.
It is in legal terms that the principle of Constitutional Tolerance finds its deepest and most remarkable expression. The
European Courts of Justice in Luxembourg and the various
Member States have enjoined us to accept European law as
the supreme law of the land. This, despite the fact that at face
value this law defies the normal pretnise of constitutionality.
Normally in our polities, we demand constitutional discipline,
i.e., accepting the authority of a higher law, only within a polity which understands itself as being constituted of one people,
however defined, bound by its own constitution adopted with
due regard to democratic and constitutional processes. Demanding constitutional obedience without such a constitution
is usually regarded as subjugation. And yet, in the Community, through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy we
subject the European peoples to the discipline of a constitution even though the European polity is composed of distinct
peoples that do not share a constitution in the normal sense.
It is a remarkable instance of Constitutional Tolerance to accept to be bound by a decision not by "my people" but by a
majority among peoples which are precisely not mine a people, if you wish, of "others." I compromise my self-determination in this fashion as an expression of this kind of internal
(towards myself) and external (towards others) Constitutional
Tolerance.
However there is a big "however" at this point. This, the
Union's most fundamental principle, that of Constitutional
Tolerance, becomes a travesty if the norms I follow, if the democratic discipline I obey is not adopted by others, my fellow

'
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European citizens, with whom I do not share the bonds of
peoplehood but instead the bonds of a Community of Values
and a new civic and political culture of transnational tolerance, but by a technocratic bureaucracy over which I have little control presided over in the unreachable supranational
Olympus of the European Council (and even European Parliament) and within the infranational netherworld of
Comitology. A non-democratic Europe extinguishes the principle of Constitutional Tolerance just as a Statal or a One Nation Europe would. And it is an equal travesty if that principle
of Constitutional Tolerance does not itself accept limits beyond which one must not interfere with Member State autonomy.
And that exactly is the weakness of the European Court and
some of its national counterparts: their scant regard for, and
weak sensibility to, the democratic processes by which the
norms which they demand supreme loyalty are enacted, and
their veritable contempt for meaningful material constitutional limits. It was evident in the Court's historic decisions
such as Van Gend & Loos where the Court said:
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish
a Common Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community,
implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement
which merely creates mutual obligations betwee11 the
contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed
with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects
Member States and also their citizens. Furthermore, it
must be noted that the nationals of the states brought together in the Community are called upon to cooperate in the
functioning of this Community through the intermediary of
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee. (Recital 10, emphasis added)
There is something deeply unsettling to present the European
Parliament and the ECOSOC of 1963 as a chamber that can be
said to express a meaningful democratic notion of citizen cooperation in governance and justify rendering laws coming
out of the Community process obligatory in nature, binding
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upon States and individuals "[i]ndependently of the legislation of Member States" (Recital 12).
This original sin of the Court · (and its acceptance by national
jurisdictions) may have been justified at the time when the international legal nature of the Community was strong and ratification of the Treaty in national parliaments could have been
considered as an effective means for democratic legitimacy.
But in today's incredibly complex and wide ranging Community, whet?- national ratification after each IGC is an impossible
Take-it-or-Leave-it pact reminiscent of the worst plebiscites in
authoritarian regimes and nothing more than a formal act
rather than a civic exercise of democracy, the continued indifference of the Court to the weak democratic basis of many of
the norms which it upholds notably in those coming out of
the Comitology process is more than unsettling: it is an act
of constitutional abdication. The late Judge Mancini was
right: The court assumes that respectable democracywhich is not there. The same could. be said of competences.
Is it not telling that in its entire jurisprudence of thousands of
decisions, the European Court has not once struck down a
Council measure on the ground that it transgressed the jurisdictional limits of the Community and encroached on State
Rights?
Somehow I believe we are not all that far away as regards the
•
normative concerns.
With all good wishes,
Joseph Weiler
June 26, 2000
Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler
HaiVard Law School
Cambridge MA 02138
Dear Professor Weiler:

'

Thank you for your gracious and compelling response ofJune
11th to my letter of March 6th. There is very litde in it with
which I would disagree.
You put matters well in this formulation:
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What is unique about the European architecture is
the fact that it demands of the Member States a constitutional discipline, in the concepts of supremacy
and direct effect, but . . . it demands it without ever
having constitutional autonomy. (If you and l can
agree on this reformulation of your original point,
our differences will have vanished).
Direct Effect and Supremacy without Autono.m y create the conditions to Europe's most original and
foundational principle: the principle of Constitutional Tolerance, since they invite constitutional discipline as a m.a tter of a voluntary act of self-negation
by the State. They do not ''have" to do it. No autonomy. But they should do it!
Perhaps, given the ambiguous nature of the idea of. "autonomy," to which you have drawn attention, I may misunderstand you. But I take it that you are pointing to the necessarily
open, pluralistic, or eveh antinomic nature of European
Union law, and to th·e resultant principle of Constitutional
Tolerance (constitutional courts' taking one another into account) as the only alternative to what you elsewhere have
called Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Professor
Antonio Carlos Pereira (University of Santiago de Compostela) makes a similar point when he insists that the true "constitution" of Europe is not just the Treaties, nor just the Treaties and the jurisprudence of the ECJ, but all the formative
forces at work including, in particular, the key decisions of
the Constitutional Court of Germany contrary to any claim
of "autonomy" for the law of the Treaties.
·
If my interpretation of your position is .c orrect, I am in basic
agreement, even though I might still prefer a different mix of
the three terms. More traditional Treaty autonomy along with
correspondingly less direct effect or supremacy would be more
coherent and therefore perhaps more stable. This; it seems to
me, is the less hegemonic (but still successful) approach taken
by the European Court of Human Rights.
I also agree that welcoming .the. alien, holding both to the One
and to the Many, is the core tension to ;be presetved. In a way,
the ideal type of such community is the family, where the
greatest love between man and woman, or between parents
and children, can coexist with a celebration of deep and un-
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bridgeable difference. Contrast this with the bonds of sameness we may feel with friends of the same sex and age. But
catttion: these intrafamily differences are ineradicable, while
cultural pluralism needs political and other support in order
to survive.
Yet you and I may still disagree on the means to our shared
ends. I think EU hegemony and, beyond that, WTO or the
like globall1egemony to be the most pressing concern. Rule
by a deracinated judicial or qt•asijudicial elite, cut off both
from national traditions and fro_m democratic majorities, is the
greatest danger. So I rejoice at every sign of resistance, such as
the Solange I or Maastricht decisions.

•

I do not quarrel with your point that national constitutional
courts may also be "totalistic" and harmful. Indeed, some lectures I gave recently in Spain were entitled "The Problem of
the Unreasonable High Court" and criticized constitutional
courts in :g eneral, not jttst the ECJ. But my solution to the
sometimes too great hubris of national courts is to try to make
room in the la\-v for regional and other infranational resistance
against them, 110t to discourage their resistance to supranational tribunals.
Perhaps our differences are simply geographic, My main entry
into European legal thought has been through Spain, while
yours may have been further ·n orth. You take quite seriously
the claims of Maastricht and like decisions and go on, rightly,
to p·oint out their shortcomings. In Spain, by contrast, Maas;_
tricht is hardly taken seriously at all. Prof. Pereira is among the
few who escape from a univocal, Kelsenian vision of Europe.
With every good wish,
Richard Stith
Richard Stith
email: Richard.Stith@valpo.edu
Valparaiso University
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